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Abstract 
Present day sophisticated and innovative attacks have resulted in exponentially increasing security problems. This 
paper therefore presents a three phased threat-oriented security model to meet the above security challenges as a part 
of proactive threat management. Integration of threat management with development process in the proposed work 
provides necessary security cover against both known and unknown threats. Identification of these threats has been 
made possible by fusion of threat modeling process and research honeytokens in conjunction with statistical model in 
the first phase.  Necessary security measures to mitigate above identified threats have been adopted in the second 
phase using multi-agent system planning. Risk reduction as a result of adoption of countermeasures has been 
evaluated in the third phase using meta-agents in multi-agent environment.  This three-phased model is placed in the 
risk analysis segment of the spiral model to enhance and strengthen the security as a part of proactive risk 
management. This work gives a new and innovative approach to provide security against all types of threats and has 
an edge over traditional techniques which only cater to predictable threats in risk management. 
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1. Introduction 
With changing threat perceptions in the present day security scenario the necessity of threat 
management in the system development life cycle is simply indispensable [4]. This paper therefore 
presents a three phased threat-oriented security model adopted as a proactive step in risk management to 
meet all types of threats both known and unknown. Identification and prioritization of threats is the 
function of first phase. Here threat modeling process has been used for identification of known threats 
whereas a detection mechanism has been planted using research honeytokens in conjunction with 
statistical model for detection of unknown threats.  
In the proposed work data fusion and information correlation from two sources i.e. statistical model in 
conjunction with research honeytokens ensures that as many as possible threats are discovered by 
developers not by malicious users.  
The above identified threats are then neutralized using multi-agent system planning in the second phase. 
Evaluation of risk reduction in respect of both known and unknown threats after adopting necessary 
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countermeasures is the responsibility of the third phase. Meta-agents have been inducted in this phase to 
provide control of software agents by keeping track on them [6, 7]. This is to ensure whether the 
countermeasures applied in Phase-2 are able to mitigate the threats as identified in Phase-1. These meta-
agents automatically monitor the performance of software agents in a multi-agent system and provide a 
security checklist to the designers and developers for taking appropriate corrective actions. This three-
phased model is embedded in the risk analysis segment of the spiral model to augment and strengthen the 
software security as a part of proactive threat management. As the spiral process is cyclic and iterative in 
nature subsequent passes of spiral process progressively result in elimination of all possible threats in 
developing secure software systems. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the pioneering works done by 
leading researchers in this area. Proposed threat-oriented security model has been discussed in Section 3. 
Adoption of the proposed model in the spiral framework has been explained in Section 4. Analysis of the 
proposed model is given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and gives outlines for future work in 
this area. 
2. Previous Research 
Security must be deeply integrated into the full software development life cycle to match the 
evolutionary nature of threats manifested these days. Different authors and researchers are already 
working in this direction for developing innovative techniques to meet these security challenges [1, 4]. 
New concepts regarding secure software systems have been given by Essafi et al. in their paper [8]. Threat 
modeling approach for identifying, documenting and mitigating security threats to a software system has 
been given by Swiderski and Synder [2]. Nowadays agent technology and multi-agent system planning is 
gaining popularity in information security and risk management.  Research in the area of multi-agent 
system planning for enhancing the security of the software systems has been presented by Bedi et al. in 
their approach MASPTA [1]. Moradian and Hakansson [6, 7] have introduced the approach to solving 
security problems in software systems using meta-agents in multi-agent environment. 
Honeypots, a new technology with enormous potential is used these days for detecting and gathering 
information about threats. Lance Spitzner [10, 13] has given a new dimension to this area of research and 
has formalized the idea of honeytokens. Different authors [14, 16] have also worked in this field to further 
strengthen the security of software systems by developing responses to new attacks of black hats. Spiral 
model developed by Boehm based on a risk-driven and cyclic approach has also contributed towards risk 
reduction for developing secure software systems [3, 11]. 
3. Proposed Threat Oriented Security Model 
Traditional technologies used these days can prevent known threats but they are unable to identify and 
avert unknown threats. Evidently failure of software security in this information age can be catastrophic 
and is unacceptable as it carries confidential data of various applications. Threat-oriented security model is 
a step in this direction and is embedded in risk analysis segment of spiral process to identify and eliminate 
all possible threats progressively for risk reduction to the acceptance level of software security. Three 
phases of the proposed model are explained below. 
3.1. Identification of Threats 
This phase deals with identification of all possible threats whether known or unknown to the system 
under development. Known or predictable threats have been identified using threat modeling process 
while research honeytokens in conjunction with statistical technique has been adopted for identification of 
unknown threats as detailed below.  
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3.1.1. Identification of Known Threats using Threat Modeling Process 
Threat modeling process provides a structured way to secure software design which involves 
understanding an adversary’s goal in attacking a system based on system’s assets of interest. Threat 
modeling process consists of characterizing the security of the system, identifying assets and access points 
and determining threats [2]. Various entities defined during the threat modeling process and their 
relationship has been indicated in the Threat Entity Relationship (T-E-R) diagram as shown in Fig. 1.   
Fig. 1. Threat-Entity Relationship Diagram 
As shown in diagram given above, a threat agent is an adversary who is motivated to harm/exploit the 
system in an unauthorized manner to drive benefit. He is primarily responsible for the threat to the assets 
of the system and can traverse the privilege boundaries in an illegal way to reach the access points to 
realize the threat. Vulnerabilities not covered by countermeasures are very easily exploited by threat 
agents to meet their objective of exploiting the system maliciously and fraudulently to their advantage. 
Responsibility of the developer is to adopt countermeasures to reduce the identified vulnerabilities to the 
minimum. In this way threat modeling helps in identifying all the vulnerable points in the system that an 
attacker can exploit to carry out threats and is a base of any secure software system. It also helps the 
designers anticipate attack goals and determine: ‘what’ the system is designed to protect; from ‘whom’ 
and ‘how’ it can be done. Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Tool supports and facilitates the designers and 
developers in this respect [5].
Although the above mechanism provides broad view of identification of known threats but security has 
no meaning unless unknown threats to the system are not identified and taken care of in the security 
framework of proactive threat management. These unknown threats may be due to exploitation of 
vulnerabilities left unnoticed during the design phase or adaptive threats by sophisticated hackers who are 
coming out with new threat perceptions. The strategy for capturing these unknown threats to the system 
adopted in this proposed model is given below. 
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3.1.2. Identification of Unknown Threats using Research Honeytokens in Conjunction with Statistical 
Model:
Research Honeytokens is a new concept to the computer security arena which in fact is most interesting 
implementation of a honeypot to detect unknown threats. The term honeytoken was first coined by 
Augusto Paes de Barros in 2003 in a discussion on honeypots. Honeytokens are honeypots that are not 
physical devices but are a digital entity that would look attractive and useful to an attacker [16]. This 
concept has been further augmented by Lance Spitzner to proactively gather information about security 
threats by providing a real system with real applications to adopt remedial measures against them. A 
research honeytoken is a highly flexible tool with no production value and any interaction with 
honeytoken means malicious or fraudulent activity. Research honeytokens deployed should be advanced 
one and updated regularly so that they are capable of attracting more attackers without them knowing it 
[10, 13].  Here, research honeytokens are being used as a digital entity planted during the design phase of 
the software life cycle itself to procure information about attacker profiles in respect of unknown threats. 
A research honeytoken is then closely monitored by human or software agents to identify new or unseen 
vulnerabilities which are being exploited by the attacker to compromise the security of the system. Further 
forensic analysis of collected data from honeytokens gives preferred attack patterns against unknown 
threats.
While research honeytokens represent a powerful tool to identify threats but they have their own 
limitations. There may be cases when the attacker may not interact with them and may have a little value 
as observable. Moreover the attackers can also use a research honeytoken maliciously to attack other non - 
honeytoken systems. This deficiency has been overcome to a certain degree by adopting statistical 
technique with honeytokens in the proposed model. A statistical based systems use statistical models to 
detect malicious activity. These systems adapt to different system behaviors or occurrences and try to 
develop a usage pattern. Predefined variables monitored over a time period are calculated for a test value. 
If this value is above the user defined threshold, then an alert is triggered. This approach does not require 
any predefined attack patterns and is capable of detecting new or unknown attacks [15]. Fusion and 
information correlation of data received from these two sources provides much better detection ability for 
wide range of threats and attacks at an early stage. Moreover, the normalcy depends on correlations 
among different parameters. The independent values of two different parameters determined using 
research honeytokens and statistical model can be taken normal, but their combination can show 
abnormality [9, 12]. In this way correlating information from multiple sources helps in detecting many 
potential unknown attacks which can result in security compromise of a system. 
3.1.3. Integrated Framework for Identification of all types of Threats for Mitigation 
This model presents a new integrated framework to identify both known and unknown threats as shown 
in Fig. 2 below. 
Fig.2. Integrated Framework for Identification of Threats Known and Unknown 
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The above diagram shows a central common data system which collects data from two sources i.e. 
research honeytokens and statistical model. Once fused, correlated and analyzed, it indicates new or 
unknown threats and their mode of attack which is fed as input to decision analysis process. Similarly 
known threats identified using threat modeling process as shown above are also incorporated as input in 
decision analysis process which gives threats to be mitigated as output. These threats are then 
communicated to the developers for selection and adoption of appropriate safeguards as given below. 
3.2. Mitigation of Threats using Multi-agent System Planning  
In this phase Multi Agent System Planning for Threat Avoidance (MASPTA) has been adopted for 
averting above identified threats. MASPTA as the name suggests is a system that works in a multi-agent 
environment for avoiding threats to a web based system where multiple autonomous agents coordinate and 
communicate with each other to achieve the goal of software security [1]. Threat trees have been created 
in this phase for above identified threats requiring mitigation to analyze how a threat is manifested 
through attack paths. In a threat tree, the threat is at the root node which needs to be mitigated and an 
attack path is a route from a leaf condition to the root threat that an attacker can take to achieve its goal as 
shown in example threat tree in Fig. 3. Here, AND refinement means all attacks should succeed for the 
corresponding threat to occur while OR refinement means presence of at least one attack can cause the 
threat to occur. The attacks at leaf nodes can not be refined further and are executed by the attacker to 
accomplish the threat.  Agents are therefore inducted against the attacks at leaf nodes as shown in the 
diagram below to prune the attack branches from the threat tree to avoid the threat at the root level. These 
agents execute their predetermined action plans to avert threats to the system [1].  
Fig.3. Threat Tree with Agents 
3.3. Monitoring and Management of Threats 
As explained above, both possible known and unknown threats are identified and appropriate 
countermeasures are applied to mitigate these threats using multi-agent system planning. Security 
measures so applied for risk reduction are now evaluated in this phase to assess the effectiveness of the 
adopted countermeasures using meta-agents in multi-agent environment. Meta–agents constitute a special 
case of agents and can be used for meta-reasoning i.e. reasoning about reasoning. Their goals are 
performing reasoning, planning actions and can have a method to evaluate individual agents [6, 7]. These 
meta-agents communicate with each other and have the ability to work with other agents to achieve a 
common goal of software security. In the proposed model these meta-agents are superior to the software 
agents applied in Phase-2 and has been applied to monitor them regarding execution of their specified 
action plans to avoid threats.  They automatically create a security checklist for designers and developers 
in the light of abnormalities observed in the security measures applied in the step above. Checklist created 
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by meta-agents identifies the left-over security holes which can be exploited by the attackers to 
compromise the security of the system and are communicated to the designers. These meta-agents monitor 
the applied safeguards continuously during execution to update the security checklist. The 
designers/developers in turn evolve necessary strategies and contingency plans for taking appropriate 
corrective actions to plug these noticed security holes. These plans may supplement the applied safeguards 
to ensure security of the software system under development.  
4. Adoption of  Threat Oriented Security Model in the Spiral Framework 
The proposed threat-oriented security model is now inducted in risk analysis segment of the spiral 
model as shown in Fig. 4. The first circuit around the threat-oriented security model embedded in risk 
segment of the spiral process has been used for identification of known threats and adoption of necessary 
countermeasures to mitigate them using multi-agent system. An intrusion detection mechanism consisting 
of research honeytokens in conjunction with statistical model has also been planted during this circuit only 
to detect unknown threats.  
Fig. 4. Induction of Threat Oriented Security Model in the Spiral Framework 
Furthermore, meta-agents in this mechanism help to determine if the safeguards already deployed to 
mitigate the known threats are adequate or not. For instance if a detection mechanism is attacked, it proves 
that an attacker found a way to this mechanism. With the knowledge of these attacks, it will be easier for 
the designers to determine and close security holes, as well as adopt additional safeguards to close the 
exploits to avoid real attacks [14] .This process is then carried out to the next segments of the spiral 
process for development of the software prototype. This prototype is then deployed for feedback in respect 
of following security parameters: 
x Detection of new or unknown threats which may be due to exploitation of vulnerabilities that have 
gone unnoticed during the first iteration with the help of planted detection mechanism. 
x Performance of the countermeasures applied against identified threats using meta-agents. 
x New security features required to be adopted to cater to additional requirements given by the customer 
after delivery of prototype. 
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On the basis of above feedback necessary security features may be incorporated by the designers to 
remove the observed anomalies in the subsequent passes around the spiral process to counter all types of 
threats known or unknown. In this way every reiteration will result in reduction of vulnerabilities at the 
design level and progressive risk reduction till it reaches the acceptance level to the satisfaction of 
customer.
5. Analysis of the Proposed Model 
The proposed threat-oriented security model is primarily meant to enhance and strengthen the security 
of the software systems to meet innovative and sophisticated mode of threats and fraudulent attempts by 
hackers of present era. Every phase of this proposed model contributes towards enhancement of the 
security measures deployed at present. A comparative study of the advantages of this proposed model over 
the traditional security mechanisms is as follows: 
x The first phase of the proposed model captures both known and unknown threats as part of proactive 
threat management whereas in the existing security mechanisms only known threats are taken care of.  
x Intelligent system using multi-agent system planning has been adopted for mitigation of all possible 
threats in the second phase as against traditional security solutions involving artificial intelligence 
which is not that significant. 
x Induction of meta-agents in the third phase is revolutionary in nature and provide security checklist to 
designers for adoption of necessary security features to make-up for the left over security holes to save 
the system from being compromised. Use of meta-agents in multi-agent environment in the existing 
security mechanisms for the purpose is still in its infancy. 
x Integration of the proposed model in the risk segment of the spiral model has resulted in significant 
decrease in design level vulnerabilities and progressively brought the risk reduction to the acceptance 
level which is our ultimate goal. This step supplements the traditional security process models for 
secure software engineering.  
x Threat Mitigation, Monitoring and Management Plan (TMMP) in the proposed model is adaptive in 
nature and goes on updating with every subsequent round of spiral process to customer’s satisfaction. 
Although this integrated approach has many advantages over the traditional security solutions, it has its 
own limitation as any security hole left uncovered and exploited by malicious users can be problematic. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work  
Traditional risk management techniques used at present have been found to be quite inadequate as they 
cater to known or predictable threats only.  It has therefore become necessary to go in for an integrated 
and comprehensive approach in proactive threat management to meet all types of potential threats. This 
work is an attempt wherein different traditional and innovative techniques detailed above have been fused 
together to evolve a threat–oriented security model which can counter all types of threats both known and 
unknown for secure software engineering. As a future work, we are extending this area of research to 
make this model cost-oriented. 
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